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Priming Presidential Votes by Direct Democracy 
Todd Donovan Western Washington University 
Caroline J.Tolbert University of Iowa Daniel A. Smith University of Florida 
We demonstrate that direct democracy can affect he issues voters consider when evaluating presidential 
candidates. Priming theory assumes that some voters have latent attitudes or predispositions that can be primed 
to affect evaluations of political candidates. We demonstrate hat: (1) state ballot measures on same sex marriage 
increased the salience of marriage as an issue that voters used when evaluating presidential candidates in 2004, 
particularly those voters less interested inthe campaign and those likely to be less attentive to the issue prior to the 
election; and (2) that the primed issue (gay marriage) was a more important factor affecting candidate choice in 
states where marriage was on the ballot. 
tudies of presidential elections have shifted from 
suggesting that campaigns have minimal effects 
(e.g., Berelson, Lazersfeld, and McPhee 1954; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Finkel 1993), toward a growing 
consensus that campaigns matter (e.g., Holbrook 
1996; Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2001; Shaw 
1999). We contribute to the study of presidential 
elections by establishing that state-level institutions of 
direct democracy provide an avenue for agenda 
setting and priming. Scholars have identified that 
information about policy issues generated during 
campaigns affects the issues voters use when evaluat- 
ing candidates (Johnston et al. 1992) and the weight 
they assign issues when voting (Druckman, Jacobs, 
and Ostermeier 2004). In this paper, we build on 
work by Nicholson (2005) to demonstrate that issue 
salience in a presidential e ection can be conditioned 
by referendums and initiatives appearing on state 
ballots. We also demonstrate that direct democracy 
can have potentially important effects on presidential 
vote choice. These findings are noteworthy because 
they link agenda setting and priming effects in a 
presidential contest to an institutional mechanism 
that campaigns may be able to control for strategic 
purposes. 
Experimental nd survey-based studies identify- 
ing campaign effects often emphasize the role of 
information generated by events largely beyond the 
control of candidates and campaigns. For example, 
sudden media attention to Iran's overture to nego- 
tiate with President Carter in the waning days of the 
1980 campaign may have doomed Carter's reelection 
prospects by refocusing public attention on the 
hostage crisis (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iygengar 
1993: 176; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Likewise, rev- 
elations of the Iran-Contra scandal in late November 
1986 led to heightened media attention to Nicaragua. 
Survey research demonstrates that this caused citizens 
to evaluate President Reagan more negatively as they 
assigned greater weight to his relatively unpopular 
Central America policy (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). 
A spike in news coverage of the 1991 Gulf War 
increased the influence of assessments of George 
H.W. Bush's handling of the war on his job approval 
and reduced public attentiveness to other policy 
issues (Krosnick and Brannon 1993), but when media 
attention returned to domestic economic issues 
approval of Bush deteriorated. 
Of course, campaigns involve attempts at identi- 
fying and promoting issues that will cast a candidate 
in a favorable light, and/or an opponent in negative 
terms (Geer 1996; Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 
2004). Avenues for this include strategic use of im- 
agery (Popkin 1991), rallies, speeches, paid advertis- 
ing (Jamieson 1996), press releases, and debates 
(Lanoue 1992). The potential for these efforts to 
achieve their strategic goals likely depends on many 
factors; including (but not limited to) how, if, or 
when themes from the campaign are reported in the 
media, whether voters are exposed to the information 
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in a manner consistent with the goal of the campaign, 
and whether or not the information is disseminated 
at the optimal place and time. Campaigns seeking to 
promote a particular issue face two dilemmas: dam- 
aging events exogenous to a campaign's strategy may 
emerge and shift he agenda unfavorably, and strategic 
attempts at promoting a specific issue depend on how 
compliant the news media is. 
We suggest that use of state-level referenda and 
initiatives can serve as another avenue that a campaign 
(or surrogate actors sympathetic to a campaign) may 
use to affect the issues voters apply to candidate 
assessments. The institutions of state-level direct 
democracy (initiative and referendum) may act as a 
tool that increases how much voters consider a 
particular issue at the time they are making their 
choice for president (Nicholson 2005). We assess this 
in the context of the 2004 presidential election. In 
that year, social conservative activists and state 
legislators placed questions proposing a ban on 
"same-sex" marriage on the ballot in 13 states.1 
Seven were placed on state ballots by state legisla- 
tures, six by citizen-group petition efforts.2 Every 
measure passed, receiving 70% support on average. 
The 2004 election provides an excellent case for 
studying if direct democracy conditioned how voters 
applied a relatively low-salience valence issue to their 
evaluations of two candidates who held distinct 
positions on the issue.3 We propose that statewide 
votes on same-sex marriage created an information 
environment that increased the likelihood that some 
voters used the gay marriage issue when evaluating 
the presidential candidates and voting. 
State-Level Direct Democracy and 
Issues in National Elections 
At present, scholars know relatively little about how 
state-level ballot measures affect the issues voters 
consider when evaluating presidential candidates. 
Candidates and parties have used ballot measures as 
"wedge" issues in attempts to divide a rival party's 
base of supporters (e.g., California's anti-illegal im- 
migrant Proposition 187 and anti-affirmative action 
initiatives, see Nicholson 2005 Chapter 6; Bowler, 
Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Chavez 1998). Prom- 
inent state-level measures such as California's Pro- 
position 13 property tax-cut of June 1978, and 
Missouri's 2006 stem cell vote, have affected political 
discourse beyond their respective states. Research also 
finds that cues from political elites shape opinions 
about ballot measures (Lupia 1994). 
Nicholson (2005) provides the most systematic 
demonstration that opinions about issues on state 
ballots may, at times, shape evaluations of candidates. 
This can have national implications when a single 
ballot issue with a nominally coordinated national 
campaign appears simultaneously on many statewide 
ballots. Nicholson shows that ballot measures can 
have broad, national effects on electoral politics by 
affecting the issues (e.g., Nuclear Freeze in 1982) 
voters use when evaluating state and congressional 
candidates-even if candidates themselves avoid 
overt discussions of issues. Nicholson found that 
ballot propositions have the potential to prime 
voters' evaluations of gubernatorial and congres- 
sional candidates across multiple states, and that 
California initiatives may prime presidential votes 
in that state, but he does not model the national 
effects of ballot measures in presidential elections. 
A Theory of Agenda Setting and 
Priming via Direct Democracy 
Nicholson argues that an issue put forth as a ballot 
proposition can shape the political agenda by influ- 
encing the issues that voters consider and then 
implicitly "prime voters to evaluate candidates" 
(2005, 15) using the issue. There is some lack of 
clarity through the academic literature in how 
"agenda setting," priming," and related concepts 
are defined and measured.4 We adopt the Ansolabe- 
here, Behr, and Iygengar (1993, 148) definition of 
agenda setting as the effect of events and information 
on the importance voters accord an issue and adopt 
their conception of priming as an extension of 
agenda setting-a form of (indirect) persuasion that 
involves the isolation of a particular issue for use 
1Technically, the measures would define marriage as being 
between a man and woman only. 
2The marriage measure states were Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. Arkansas, Michigan, 
Missouri, Ohio, and Oregon were considered competitive states 
early in the campaign. Louisiana and Missouri placed their 
measures as referendums on late-season primary ballots. 
3John Kerry acknowledges he opposed a Constitutional ban on 
same-sex marriage and supported "civil unions" (Boston Globe 
February 24 2004). George W. Bush promoted the Constitutional 
ban and opposed civil unions. The August 2004 Pew survey 
found 60% opposed to "allowing gays and lesbians to marry 
legally" and 29% in favor. 
4In addition to occasional overlap in use of these terms, related 
concepts include "issue framing" (Druckman 2004, 672). 
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in evaluating politicians (1993, 176). The logic of 
priming effects in campaigns derives, in part, from 
theories of choice that treat the recall of consider- 
ations from memory as a rather passive process. As 
Mendelberg notes in a study of the priming of 
negative racial predispositions, "priming occurs when 
a person makes greater use of a given predisposi- 
tion after exposure to communication that cues it in 
some way" (2001, 120). These models (e.g., Krosnick 
and Kinder 1990; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick 
and Brannon 1983) and others assume that voters 
make decisions on the basis of bits and pieces of 
"information, prototypes, ymbols, slogans and prej- 
udices" (Bartels 2003, 50), and "considerations that 
are immediately salient" (Zaller 1992, 49). If events 
bring increased attention to a predisposition about an 
issue that voters have stored in memory, then voters 
may be primed, if even unconsciously, to become 
more likely to consider that issue when evaluating 
candidates." 
Studies of priming often attribute heightened 
issue salience to the effects of mass media (e.g., 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987; chap. 7). This begs the 
question of how actual campaign events affect he 
content of news coverage, and hence, public attention 
to an issue. Mendelberg (2001, 4) provides examples 
of such mechanisms, noting that the campaign 
messages of Barry Goldwater (1964), Richard Nixon 
(1968), and others conveyed implicitly racial appeals 
that primed white voters' racial predispositions. 
Mendelberg shows the power Willie Horton had on 
generating media coverage that primed voters to 
apply racial resentment when evaluating Michael 
Dukakis in 1988. Nicholson (2005, 34) proposes that 
direct democracy is also a mechanism that can alter 
the set of issues voters consider to be important- 
particularly when morality issues are proposed for 
public votes. We contend that state-level ballot 
measures act as a mechanism that affects the salience 
of an issue by increasing the amount of public 
attention directed at an issue and the timing of that 
attention. 
Downs (1972) describes an issue-attention cycle 
where the duration of public attention to an issue 
often moves from an initial "preproblem stage" 
where mainly elites and attentive groups may be 
alarmed by a problem, through an "alarmed dis- 
covery" stage where mass attention increases, to a 
subsequent gradual decline in attention. We suggest 
that initiative and referendum campaigns associated 
with an issue provide a device to alter or extend the 
issue-attention cycle. Media attention associated with 
legislative placement of referendums banning same- 
sex marriage on state ballots, state-level petition 
drives to qualify ballot initiatives, and campaign 
discourse associated with the issue may have gener- 
ated more attention to gay marriage in these states 
than elsewhere, increasing the likelihood that voters 
recalled gay marriage from memory when they were 
evaluating presidential candidates, and thus increas- 
ing the likelihood that voters applied the issue to 
their candidate choice. By synchronizing the timing 
of the ballot measure campaigns with the presidential 
campaigns, direct democracy may cause attention to 
an issue to peak when voters are evaluating presi- 
dential candidates. 
Gay Marriage and the 2004 
Presidential Election 
Issues associated with gay and lesbian rights have 
been a recurring feature in state and local politics 
(Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel, 
Querze, and Lindaman 2007), but a series of events 
caused gay marriage to emerge rather suddenly as a 
national issue in the early stages of the 2004 cam- 
paign. Prior to 2004, state court cases had brought 
some attention to the issue. In his January 20, 2004 
State of the Union speech, President George W. Bush 
mentioned the prospect of a federal constitutional 
amendment banning same sex marriage if "judges 
insist on forcing their arbitrary will on the people." 
On February 6, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court issued an advisory opinion stating that a 
proposed civil union bill was unconstitutional 
because it denied gay couples equal access to mar- 
riage. On February 9, San Francisco Mayor Gavin 
Newsom announced he wanted to explore how the 
city could allow same sex couples to wed. Two days 
later, Bush announced his endorsement of a constitu- 
tional amendment o prohibit same-sex marriages 
and called for a congressional vote on the matter. 
Newsom focused even greater attention on the issue 
the next day (February 12) when he authorized same- 
sex weddings in San Francisco. Weddings continued 
in the city until blocked by a California court four 
weeks later. Multnomah County (Portland) Oregon 
followed San Francisco and began performing same- 
sex marriages on March 3, with the Oregon weddings 
continuing until April 20. Efforts to qualify state 
5We make no assumptions about whether negative primes or 
negative predispositions are necessary or sufficient for priming. 
Our results, and those of Mendelberg (2001), demonstrate 
instances where the prime applies to latent negative predisposi- 
tions about minority groups. 
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constitutional amendments were also launched in 
dozens of states during this period. 
Nationally, media attention to gay marriage 
peaked in late February in response to these events, 
then declined through the summer, and peaked again 
in late October with a focus on state marriage 
measures.6 Voters generally tend to be more aware 
of ballot questions about morality issues than other 
ballot measures, particularly those questions that 
attract media attention (Nicholson 2003). We assess 
one aspect of media attention to gay marriage by 
examining the frequency that "gay marriage" was men- 
tioned by newspapers in states where gay marriage 
was on the November ballot, and by comparable 
papers from states where marriage was not on the 
ballot. Full details of our case selection method, and 
more refined, color graphic illustrations of trends in 
press attention to gay marriage, are available online, 
in the appendix.'7 
Figure 1 plots the frequency that gay marriage was 
mentioned in several newspapers from states where the 
issue was before the voters, and Figure 2 plots the same 
trends for several comparable papers from states 
where it was not on the ballot. Trends illustrate the 
proportion of all stories about gay marriage from 
January through the end of October that occurred in 
each two week period. In both figures there is a peak 
in early March, when national media attention to the 
issue spiked as same-sex weddings occurred in San 
Francisco and Portland. The figures illustrate that 
press coverage of gay marriage in both sets of states 
was at a relative low point by early August (compared 
to late February and early March). However, in states 
where marriage was on the November ballot, in most 
newspapers the frequency that gay marriage was 
mentioned peaked again in October relative to where 
it was in February and March. In 14 of 16 papers 
from states where marriage was not on the ballot, we 
find relatively lower levels of attention to gay mar- 
riage in late October compared to February (two 
exceptions being Denver and St. Petersburg, FL). This 
second peak in press attention to gay marriage in 
states where it was on the ballot reflects a different 
information environment in those states, one we 
assume was associated with state-level marriage 
campaigns. Although many of the state marriage 
campaigns were low-budget affairs, Bush and Kerry's 
positions on the issue were made clear by marriage 
campaigns and media attention (Campbell and Mon- 
son N.d.). Well-placed Bush campaign officials in 
states with marriage measures also worked to link 
Kerry to the unpopular position of supporting ay 
marriage.8 
Extant research making use of opinion data have 
found that, nationally, opposition to gay marriage 
was associated with support for Bush (Hillygus and 
Shields 2005; Lewis 2005), and that some voters in 
states with marriage bans were more likely to support 
Bush (Campbell and Monson, N.d.). However, these 
studies do not examine how different s ate electoral 
contexts affected the salience and priming effects of 
gay marriage.9 In the analysis below, we examine 
survey data from early August and from the second 
half of October to test if respondents in states with 
marriage measures assigned greater importance to the 
gay marriage issue toward the end of the campaign, 
and if voters in those states were primed to apply gay 
marriage when voting for president. 
Given the marriage campaigns and associated 
discourse and media attention where they occurred, 
gay marriage had the potential to be an issue for voters 
to use when evaluating the presidential candidates. 
Indeed there is evidence of public awareness of the 
marriage measures. Public opinion data collected by 
the Pew Foundation in the second half of October'0 
found that 42% of respondents in a national sample 
reported being aware of initiative, referendums, or 
constitutional amendments that would appear on 
their state ballot. Forty-five percent of respondents 
in states where marriage measures qualified men- 
tioned gay marriage when asked an open-ended 
question about which measures were on their ballot. 
6Evidence of this can be seen in a Goolge Trends search of news 
references to the term "gay marriage" in 2004. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for introducing us to Google Trends. A 
graph of these trends is archived in Appendix B at the online 
appendix at http://journalofpolitics.org. 
7Additional graphs are available at the online appendix. 
8Examples of campaign efforts to distinguish between Bush and 
Kerry on the basis of marriage are in Appendix C. A Pew survey 
from mid 2004 found just 29% support for "allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally." 
9These studies use quite different methods, and reach different 
conclusions about the importance of gay marriage in 2004. 
Hillygus and Shields (2005) used postelection data to model 
the effects of attitudes about a U.S. constitutional mendment on 
vote choice. Their models do not directly compare the effect of 
residence in a ban state to residence in all other states. Lewis 
(2005) employs urvey data from early in the campaign (March 
2004) and does not account for the state a respondent lived in. 
Campbell and Monson (N.d.) and Mulligan (2008) estimate 
models that do allow for direct comparisons of the effect of 
residing in a state with a marriage ban versus residing elsewhere, 
and the former have no measures of attitudes about gay marriage. 
1xThe national random sample telephone Mid October Political 
Survey was conducted for Pew by the Princeton Research 
Associates between October 15 and 19 and included 1,307 
registered voters from the continental United States. Available: 
http://www.people-press.org. 
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FIGURE 1 Proportion of total newspaper attention to gay marriage from January 1, 2004 - October 31, 
2004 in states with marriage measures on the ballot. 
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Hypotheses 
We expect gay marriage had an agenda-setting effect 
that caused people in states with marriage measures 
to be more likely to consider gay marriage when 
assessing presidential candidates. We also expect that 
the potential for the effect was conditional on how 
receptive a person was to being primed to consider 
gay marriage. Studies of priming effects suggest hat 
people knowledgeable about (or "experts" on) an 
issue may be the least receptive to a prime, in part 
because they have sufficient preexisting awareness to 
be immune to the prime. Empirical evidence of this 
is inconsistent (Krosnick and Brannon 1993, 965). 
However, framing effects-a related concept-have 
also been shown to be conditional-that is, there are 
demonstrated limits to framing effects (Druckman 
2001). Kinder and Sanders (1990) demonstrate that 
better-informed people were less susceptible to the 
framing of affirmative action, and Haider-Markel and 
Joslyn (2001) find similar effects with gun control. 
Priming theory assumes people have a range of 
considerations stored in memory that might be used 
when making decisions (Zaller 1992) and that they 
make choices based on the information most readily 
available. A prime can increase the likelihood that a 
particular piece of information i  memory is used. 
We suggest those having greater focus on the 
issue being primed, and those more attentive to issues 
generally, may be less receptive to the prime. This is 
similar to Converse's point (1962, 589) that people 
who consume the most political information may be 
least likely to have their attitudes affected by addi- 
tional information (see also McGuire 1968). Put 
differently, some voters may have readily accessible 
concerns about gay marriage such that the issue need 
not be primed in order for it to enter into their range 
of considerations. Others, who may have latent 
predispositions but who are not focused on the issue, 
may be more likely to be primed to consider the issue 
when evaluating candidates. In this case, born again 
or fundamentalist Christians may have already have a 
higher level of concern about gay marriage (Olson, 
Cadge, and Harrison 2006) regardless of the cam- 
paign context they resided in, leaving them less 
receptive to the agenda setting effects of same sex 
marriage measures. We also expect voters who are 
most attentive to a campaign to be more attentive to 
issues generally, so when a ballot measure focuses 
attention on any specific issue their propensity to 
consider that issue is less likely to be affected 
(compared to less interested people). We expect hese 
people may also be less affected by additional 
information about the issue because their concerns 
about the issue may be more immediate (rather than 
latent) and already accessible. 
Of course marriage measures may have reached 
state ballots because people in those states were 
predisposed to consider gay marriage, and to support 
President Bush. We test for this endogeneity (see 
Nicholson 2005, 39-40) by examining if people in 
states with marriage measures were already more 
concerned about gay marriage arly in the campaign 
season. If the ballot measures primed the marriage 
issue, attitudes measured before the campaign season 
should show no relationship between saying that gay 
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FIGURE 2 Proportion of total newspaper attention to gay marriage from January 1, 2004 - October 31, 
2004 in states without marriage measures on the ballot. 
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marriage was very important, and residence in a state 
where marriage was on the ballot-but we should see 
this relationship late in the season if the ballot 
measures prompted people to consider gay marriage 
when evaluating candidates. We also expect that the 
marriage measures primed voters in those states to 
link their concerns about gay marriage to their choice 
for president. 
Data and Measures 
We test our hypotheses with data from three national 
polls conducted in 2004 by Pew Research Center: an 
early August 2004 survey,l" a mid-October survey,12 
and with a pre/postelection panel survey.'3 By com- 
paring results across the August and October sam- 
ples, we can test if residents in states with marriage on 
the ballot were simply predisposed to be concerned 
about gay marriage or if ballot measures had agenda- 
setting effects. The November postelection survey 
included a panel of respondents from the October 
sample and is used as robustness check. 
The Pew early August and mid-October preelec- 
tion surveys included an identical battery of ques- 
tions asking voters how concerned they were about a 
fixed list of 16 issues when considering the presiden- 
tial candidates. Respondents were asked, "In making 
your decision about who to vote for in the presi- 
dential election, how important will the issue of { } 
be?" with the 16 issues rotated randomly. In each 
period, terrorism, the economy, Iraq, jobs, and 
education ranked highest nationally. Gay marriage 
ranked as one of the least-mentioned issues in each 
period, yet one-third of respondents did indicate that 
the issue was "very important." A simple cross 
tabulation of the August data comparing responses 
from the 13 states where marriage measures would be 
voted on, to responses from other states, demon- 
strates there was no significant difference in percep- 
tions of the importance of gay marriage across the 
two groups (Chi Square = 0.33, p = .56). 
We suggest that measuring attitudes about gay 
marriage in terms of those who felt it was a "very 
important" issue captures the salience of the issue 
and provides a valid surrogate measure of opposition 
to gay marriage. As evidence of this, the August 
survey asked the policy issue concern question cited 
above, as well as a specific question about supporting 
or opposing gay marriage. In that survey, we find that 
81% of respondents who said that gay marriage was 
a very important" issue also opposed gay marriage. 
In other words, there is a strong relationship between 
"Pew Nationally representative sample of 1,512 adults living in 
the continental United States. Telephone interviews conducted by 
the Princeton Data Source from August 5 to 10, 2004. Available: 
http://www.people-press.org. 
'2See note 10 above. 
'3The Pew Post Election Callback Survey used telephone re- 
interviews conducted November 5-8, 2004 among 1,209 voters 
who had been contacted in one of two October Pew surveys (both 
random, national telephone surveys). See Appendix D at the 
online appendix. 
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salience, as measured by the Pew gay marriage issue 
concern question, and valence. The mid-October Pew 
survey lacks a specific question about opposition to 
gay marriage, but the August data provide strong 
evidence that people very concerned about gay 
marriage were overwhelmingly opposed to gay 
marriage. 
Testing for Agenda Setting and 
Issue Priming 
In Table 1 we report logistic regression models that 
estimate if an individual reported being "very con- 
cerned" about gay marriage when evaluating presi- 
dential candidates in August and October, respectively. 
Respondents indicating that the gay marriage issue 
was very important" are coded 1, and those in- 
dicating the issue was only "somewhat important," 
"not too important," or not at all important" are 
coded 0.14 
Since we assume that concerns about gay mar- 
riage are accentuated by campaigns associated with 
same sex marriage measures, one primary explana- 
tory variable is the presence or absence of a marriage 
measure in a respondent's state. This is represented 
with a dummy variable identifying residence in states 
where marriage was on the ballot. We expect resi- 
dence in a ban state to have more of an effect on 
concern about gay marriage in mid October, than in 
early August when there was less attention to the 
issue (See Figure 1). 
Models testing for this agenda-setting effect also 
include several necessary control variables. Given 
findings that Protestants and Republicans are less 
supportive of ballot measures extending rights to gays 
and lesbians (Loftus 2001), and Protestants are less 
supportive of same sex marriage (Olson, Cadge, and 
Harrison 2006), we account for religion with a 
dummy variable representing self-identified Protes- 
tants. As a more restrictive test, we also estimate 
models with religion measured by a question asking 
respondents if they described themselves as "born 
again, evangelical Christian, or fundamentalist Chris- 
tian." 5 Partisanship is represented with two dum- 
mies for Republicans and Democrats, respectively, 
with independents serving as the reference group.'o 
Past studies establish that education is associated with 
support for civil liberties for gays and lesbians (Loftus 
2001; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Studies 
of opinions about homosexuality have also found 
that heterosexual men and women reason differently 
about gays and lesbians, respectively, with men less 
likely than women to support recognition of same- 
sex relationships (Herek 2002). Women are also less 
likely than men to condemn homosexuality on 
morality grounds, while blacks may be more likely 
than whites to do so (Loftus 2001: 772-3). Thus, our 
models also control for education (an ordinal scale), 
gender (1 = female, O = male), race/ethnicity (1 = 
white, 0 = other), as well as age (in years) and 
income (an ordinal scale).7 
Estimates of presidential vote choice also control 
for the importance of major issues that voters may 
have used when evaluating the 2004 presidential 
candidates, including concerns about terrorism, the 
economy, and the Iraq War.'8 Finally, all models 
reported below are estimated by clustering respond- 
ents by state to adjust the standard errors for the 
multilevel data, as well as using robust (Huber- 
White) standard errors.19 
Direct Democracy Agenda Setting 
Table 1 presents the results of three models estimat- 
ing the importance voters accorded gay marriage 
when evaluating presidential candidates in 2004. Each 
model is first estimated with data from the early 
14Few people said that any given issue was not at all important, 
or not very important. The meaningful variation on the Pew 
questions about issue importance is between saying an issue was 
"very important," or otherwise. Thus, we collapse the issue 
importance variable into a binary measure. 
'5See coding details in Appendix E at the online appendix. 
16Alternate models estimates with a 7-point scale produce the 
same substantive conclusions. See Appendix Table A4 at the 
online appendix. 
17See coding details in Appendix E at the online appendix. 
'8These were measured in the same fixed list of (rotated) 
questions about issues important in evaluating presidential 
candidates that also included the gay marriage question. 
19We estimated our models with other controls for state-level 
factors associated with the occurrence of gay marriage measures, 
including Bush's 2000 vote share in a state, Bush's 2004 vote 
share, state-level measures of attitudes about homosexuality 
(from Brace et al. 2002), a dummy variable representing initia- 
tive states, and an instrument that predicted the probability of a 
state having a gay marriage proposition estimated by a logistic 
regression equation accounting for the presence of a state 
initiative process and the state's support for Bush. Apart from 
a loss of cases associated with the Brace et al. measure, the 
substantive results reported here are similar when these controls 
added to these models. The instruments and the binary variable 
for initiative state were not significant, whereas measures of Bush 
vote were. 
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TABLE 
1 
Agenda 
Setting: 
Importance 
of 
Gay 
Marriage 
Issue 
in 
Evaluating 
Presidential 
Candidates. 
Estimated 
with 
August 
5 
- 
10 
data, 
and 
October 
15 
- 
19 
data 
Model 
1 
August 
Model 
1 
October 
Model 
2 
August 
Model 
2 
October 
Model 
3 
August 
Model 
3 
October 
Reside 
in 
Marriage 
Ban 
State 
.04 
(.14) 
.809 
.25 
(.14) 
.074 
.10 
(.20) 
.606 
.40 
(.21) 
.052 
.43 
(.52) 
.404 
2.32 
(.71) 
.001 
Born-Again 
Christian 
.99 
(.15) 
.000 
1.03 
(.17) 
.000 
.94 
(.13) 
.000 
.90 
(.15) 
.000 
Interested
in 
Politics 
.06 
(.08) 
.428 
.23 
(.11) 
. 30 
Ban 
State 
* 
Bor -Again 
-.26 
(.29) 
.372 
-.56 
(.31) 
.070 
B n 
State 
* 
Politic l 
Interest 
-.13 
(.15) 
.399 
-.61 
(.19) 
.002 
Republican 
.99 
(.16) 
.000 
.42 
(.15) 
.006 
.90 
(.16) 
.000 
.29 
(.17) 
.084 
.89 
(.16) 
.000 
.23 
(.17) 
.184 
Democrat 
-.03 
(.17) 
.837 
-.24 
(.17) 
.142 
-.06 
(.17) 
.727 
-.26 
(.18) 
.157 
-.06 
(.17) 
.725 
-.26 
(.18) 
.153 
Age 
-.004 
(.004) 
.226 
.002 
(.004) 
.628 
-.004 
(.004) 
.345 
.004 
(.004) 
.384 
-.003 
(.004) 
.388 
.004 
(.005) 
.428 
M le 
-.03 
(.13) 
.843 
-.31 
(.13) 
.017 
-.01 
(.13) 
.926 
-.33 
(.14) 
.022 
.02 
(.13) 
.876 
-.30 
(.14) 
.034 
White 
.10 
(.19) 
.591 
-.46 
(.17) 
.007 
.16 
(.19) 
.388 
-.51 
(.20) 
.009 
.16 
(.19) 
.388 
-.47 
(.20) 
.017 
Education 
-.17 
(.04) 
.000 
-.07 
(.04) 
.097 
-.16 
(.04) 
.000 
-.04 
(.05) 
.413 
-.16 
(.05) 
.000 
-.04 
(.05) 
.368 
Income
.004 
(.03) 
.895 
-.05 
(.03) 
.147 
.02 
(.03) 
.527 
-.04 
(.04) 
.250 
.02 
(.03) 
.606 
-.04 
(.04) 
.268 
Protestant 
.35 
(.13) 
.009 
.46 
(.13) 
.000 
Constant 
-.40 
(.33) 
.225 
-.77 
(.40) 
.052 
-.76 
(.34) 
.024 
-.46 
(.40) 
.250 
-.98 
(.39) 
.012 
-1.22 
(.52) 
.019 
P eudo 
R2 
.06 
.04 
.09 
.06 
.09 
.07 
Wald 
Chi2 
85.46 
53.32 
.000 
120.40 
.000 
73.83 
.000 
120.63 
.000 
82.74 
.000 
Number 
1246 
1057 
1259 
1067 
1250 
1063 
Note: 
The 
dependent 
variable 
is 
the 
importance 
a 
respondent 
assigns 
the 
gay 
marriage 
issue. 
"Very 
important" 
is 
coded 
1, 
other 
responses= 
0. 
Unstandardized 
logistic 
regression 
coefficients 
with 
robust 
standard 
errors 
in 
parentheses. 
Standard 
errors 
adju ted 
by 
clustering 
cases 
by 
state. 
Statistical 
significance 
(p 
values) 
reported 
to 
the 
right 
of 
the 
coefficients 
are 
based 
on 
wo-tailed 
tests. 
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August Pew survey and then with data from the mid- 
October Pew survey. We expect to find an agenda- 
setting effect in surveys conducted in ban states in 
conjunction with the October spike in attention to 
gay marriage. Prior to the campaign (early August) 
we expect less difference in issue salience associated 
with residence in a state with a marriage ban 
measure. 
Estimates in Table 1 are consistent with these 
expectations. Model 1 (in Column 1) demonstrates 
that in August there was no relationship between 
residing in marriage vote state and believing the issue 
of gay marriage was very important for evaluating 
presidential candidates. When Model 1 is estimated 
using survey data from mid-October (in Column 2), 
we find that respondents in states where gay mar- 
riage was on the ballot were significantly more likely 
to say gay marriage was very important in their 
consideration of presidential candidates. As an ad- 
ditional check for endogeneity, we also use Model 1 
to estimate if residence in marriage ban states was 
associated with increased likelihood saying "moral 
values" were very important issues (see Appendix 
Table A2). Respondents in states with marriage on 
the ballot were no more likely to cite moral values as 
very important in August or October, yet they did 
become more likely to rank gay marriage as very 
important by mid-October. This is consistent with 
the idea that state campaigns about marriage-- 
rather than something else unique to these states-- 
increased the salience of gay marriage as an issue for 
evaluating presidential candidates. 
As expected, partisanship, religion, education, 
race, and gender also affect the likelihood that a 
respondent said the issue was very important. In each 
time period, Republicans, Protestants, and those with 
less education were significantly more likely, respec- 
tively, to say that gay marriage was a very important 
issue for them when evaluating the presidential 
candidates. Nonwhites and women were more con- 
cerned about gay marriage in October, but not in 
August. These data suggest hat near the end of the 
campaign, same-sex marriage ballot measures height- 
ened the salience of gay marriage for some voters in 
states where the issue was on the ballot. 
We noted above that the agenda-setting effects of 
the marriage measures could affect hose who were 
less attentive to the campaign generally and to gay 
marriage specifically. Estimates reported in Table 1 
demonstrate that people who identified themselves 
as "born again," "Evangelical" or "Fundamentalist" 
Christians were significantly more likely to men- 
tion that gay marriage was a very important issue, 
regardless of the time or place they were surveyed."U 
Model 2 tests if the agenda-setting effect of these 
ballot measures was conditional (Jaccard, Turrisi, and 
Wan 1990, 26-27) on whether a respondent was a 
born again Christian or not; Model 3 tests if the 
agenda-setting effect was conditional on (low) self- 
reported interest21 in the presidential campaign. In 
Model 2, the main coefficient for residence in a state 
with marriage on the ballot reflects the conditional 
effect of being in a ban state for a person who is not a 
born again Christian. In Model 3, the main coefficient 
for residence in a marriage vote state reflects the 
conditional effect of levels of interest in the election. 
The substantive meaning of the estimates from Table 1 
are better understood when presented as probability 
simulations. Clarify simulations where other variables 
are set to their mean/modal values are reported in 
Table 2. 
In the August estimation of Model 2, neither the 
interaction term nor the coefficient for residence in a 
marriage ban state are statistically significant. That is 
in August, nonborn again Christians were no more 
likely to believe gay marriage was an important issue 
in the election, regardless of where they lived. Later in 
October, however, we find that non-born again / 
non-fundamentalist respondents were more likely to 
believe gay marriage was an important issue in the 
presidential election if they lived in a state with a 
marriage ban measure, as evident by the base term for 
residence in a state with a vote on marriage. We find 
a similar effect with the interaction between interest 
and residence in a state with a marriage measure 
(Model 3). 
Non-born again respondents are estimated to 
have a .09 increased probability of rating gay mar- 
riage as a very important issue if they lived in a state 
where marriage was placed on the ballot. The effects 
of political interest illustrated in Table 2 are striking. 
People reporting "quite a lot" of interest in the 
presidential campaign are estimated to have roughly 
the same low probability of saying that gay marriage 
was an important issue, regardless of whether they 
were exposed to a same sex marriage campaign. It is 
important o note that 70% of respondents reported 
this level of interest in October. However, the 
minority who reported less interest in the campaign 
were much more likely to mention gay marriage as an 
issue to evaluate candidates if they lived in a state 
20This is seen in Model 3 (Table 1) 
21Respondents were asked, "How much thought have you given 
to the upcoming presidential e ection? Values are coded as quite a 
lot (3), some (2), only a little (1), and none (0). 
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where attention to the gay marriage question was 
heightened by a same sex marriage measure. 
Gay Marriage and Presidential 
Vote Choice 
Thus far we have demonstrated agenda-setting effects 
of state level marriage measures in the presidential 
election. There were similar trajectories of press 
attention to gay marriage in metropolitan ewspapers 
through the summer of 2004, with press attention to 
gay marriage then rising more in October in states 
where marriage was on the ballot. Table 1 that demon- 
strates that respondents in states with marriage on 
the ballot-rated gay marriage as "very important" in 
October (but not August). 
But did the salience of gay marriage affect how 
people in states with marriage ban measures voted? 
That is, did residence in a marriage ban state increase 
the likelihood that voters focused on the gay marriage 
issue when choosing between candidates? Recall that 
our measure of the importance voters assigned gay 
marriage taps both the salience and valence of the 
issue; those saying gay marriage was a very important 
issue were overwhelmingly opposed to gay marriage. 
Given that Bush's opposition to gay marriage was 
explicit and well publicized, and given our issue 
importance measure captures opposition to gay mar- 
riage, it is not surprising that people who reported 
being very concerned about gay marriage were more 
likely to vote for Bush in 2004. This can be seen in 
Column 1 of Table 3. 
In order to test if marriage ballot measures 
primed voters to have an increased likelihood of 
voting Bush, we estimate models of vote choice that 
include an interaction between residence in a ban 
state and rating ay marriage as a very important issue. 
The coefficients for the original dummy variable 
components of this interaction (columns 2, 3, and 4 
in Table 3) represent conditional effects. That is, the 
estimate for "resides in gay marriage ban state" 
reflects the effect of that variable if a respondent 
reported that gay marriage was not very important. 
The estimate for "gay marriage issue very important" 
reflects the effect of that variable for people who do 
not live in ban states. 
Estimates of these models are reported in Table 3. 
The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent 
reported an intention to vote Bush, 0 if Kerry or 
other. Models reported in the first hree columns are 
estimated with October (preelection) data, the final 
column replicates the priming model with data from 
November. Column 1 reports the estimate of Bush 
vote without the priming interaction and shows 
people concerned with gay marriage were more likely 
to vote Bush, other things equal. Columns 2, 3, and 4 
include the interaction term and show that under 
various specifications, the importance of gay mar- 
riage on Bush support is contingent upon whether a
person lived in a state with marriage on the ballot.22 
The model in Column 4 replicates Column 3 by 
estimating the respondent's reported vote with their 
preelection report of the importance of the gay 
marriage issue. With alternative specifications of 
these models employing different controls for religion 
(Table 3) and endogeneity (reported in Appendix 
Table A3), we consistently find a significant relation- 
ship between support for Bush and the interaction of 
assessments of gay marriage and residence in a 
marriage ban state.23 The effect of the salience of 
gay marriage on presidential voting is magnified 
among respondents who lived where there was a 
statewide same-sex marriage campaign. We find the 
same effect (reported in Appendix Table A4) when 
models in Table 3 are estimated with one subsample 
of respondents from states with marriage measures 
and one subsample of other respondents. There is a 
significant, positive relationship between ranking ay 
marriage as important and Bush vote among people 
in the marriage vote state subsample, but no signifi- 
cant relationship among people in the other group. 
Beyond the priming effect of these campaigns, 
there could be something distinctive about people in 
the set of states where these ballot measures appeared; 
something that might increase observed consistency 
between issue concerns and vote choice across all 
manner of issues, including "moral" issues generally. 
Table 4 replicates the priming model reported in 
Table 3 (Column 3) with terms that represent he 
interaction between residence in a marriage ban state 
and whether espondents rated terrorism, Iraq, the 
economy, or "moral values" as very important issues, 
respectively. Results in Table 4 demonstrate hat none 
of these counterfactual interaction effects are signifi- 
cant. Although each issue had significant effects on 
vote choice, "moral values" and other issues had no 
more (nor less) effect on support for Bush among 
people residing in states where marriage was on the 
22A comparison of results between Column 2 and Column 3 also 
demonstrates that the priming effect, as represented by the 
interaction, holds whether we measure religion as "Protestant" 
or as "born again / Evangelical /Fundamentalist / Christian." 
23We do not find this effect when these models are replicated 
with data from August. 
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TABLE 2 Predicted Probabilities of Rating Gay Marriage as a Very Important Issue in Evaluating 
Presidential Candidates, October 2004 
Reside in Marriage Ban State Reside in Other State 
Religion 
Born-again / Evangelical / .43 (.04) .46 (.03) 
Fundamentalist Christian 
Non Born-again / Evangelical / .32 (.03) .23 (.02) 
Fundamentalist Christian 
Interest in campaign 
Quite a lot .27 (.03) .25 (.04) 
Some .32 (.05) .23 (.03) 
Little .41 (.06) .19 (.04) 
None .50 (.10) .16 (.04) 
Note: Estimated with Clarify from models in Table 1. Explanatory variables set at mean/modal values. Standard errors in parentheses. 
ballot. Gay marriage, in contrast, did have a greater 
effect on Bush support in states where marriage was 
on the ballot. 
The October Pew survey found 78% citing the 
economy as a very important issue for evaluating the 
candidates, 77% citing terrorism, 74% Iraq, com- 
pared to 32% citing gay marriage. By this measure, 
gay marriage was less important han other issues in 
affecting voting for president in 2004. Nonetheless, 
gay marriage was an important issue for a substantial 
number of voters. Probability simulations generated 
from estimates in Table 3 (reported in Table 5) 
illustrate the gay marriage issue had a notable effect 
on candidate choice in states where it was on the 
ballot. Table 5 illustrates that nationally, people 
ranking gay marriage as very important had a .57 
estimated probability of supporting Bush (using 
estimates from Column 1, Table 3). People who 
ranked the issue as very important but did not reside 
in states where marriage ban campaigns primed the 
issue are predicted to be marginal Bush supporters 
(.53), whereas people who ranked the issue as very 
important who did live where marriage campaigns 
primed the issue are predicted to be solid (.69) Bush 
supporters, all else equal. We should stress that these 
probabilities are generated from simulations that set 
control variables at their mean/modal values (e.g., 
a white Protestant, female independent with mean 
levels of education, age and income, who believed 
Iraq, terrorism and the economy were each very 
important in evaluating the presidential candidates). 
The simulations illustrate that this distinct set of 
voters, living in states where marriage was on the 
ballot, may have been primed by gay marriage 
measures to move from marginal Bush supporters 
to likely Bush supporters. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
State-level institutions of direct democracy provide 
an institutional mechanism that can affect presiden- 
tial elections. Our analysis demonstrates that ballot 
measures had agenda setting and priming effects in a 
presidential election. Our research extends on exist- 
ing literature by demonstrating that priming is 
evident outside the laboratory, in the "real world" 
context of presidential e ections. Existing studies have 
demonstrated priming effects on presidential evalua- 
tions, and our research demonstrates that priming 
also affects actual presidential vote intentions and 
reported vote choice. Where other evidence of 
priming affecting presidential evaluations identifies 
the mechanism for the prime as events exogenous to 
a campaign (e.g., scandal, war), we identify a mech- 
anism (ballot measures) that campaigns or campaign 
surrogates may have more control over. It is also a 
mechanism that allows priming to occur when people 
are evaluating the candidates and voting. 
Our results demonstrate that state same-sex 
marriage campaigns encouraged some voters, partic- 
ularly people we assume were more likely to have 
predispositions about gay marriage that are latent 
(voters who were not born again Christians and those 
less attentive to politics), to be more likely to see gay 
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TABLE 3 Priming: 2004 Bush Support Among Respondents in Marriage Ban States who Ranked Gay 
Marriage as Very Important Issue (October Pre-Election and November Post-Election National 
Samples) 
Intend to Vote Intend to Vote Intend to Vote Voted for Bush 
Bush (October) Bush (October) Bush (October) (November) 
Coef (sig) p Coef (sig) p Coef (sig) p Coef (sig) p 
Resides in Gay Marriage -.21 (.27) .448 -.48 (.25) .056 -.95 (.43) .025 
Ban State 
Gay Marriage Issue Very .38 (.23) .099 .15 (.27) .574 -.06 (.26) .820 -.45 (.34) .187 
Important in Pres. Choice 
Ban State* Gay Marriage .90 (.44) .039 1.08 (.45) .016 2.14 (.84) .011 
Issue Very Important 
Terrorism Issue Very 2.14 (.28) .000 2.17 (.28) .000 2.15 (.27) .000 2.12 (.41) .000 
Important in Pres. Choice 
Iraq Issue Very Important -.68 (.24) .004 -.70 (.24) .003 -.69 (.25) .005 -.87 (.34) .010 
in Pres. Choice 
Economy Very Important -1.34 (.25) .000 -1.33 (.24) .000 -1.26 (.26) .000 -.97 (.35) .006 
in Pres. Choice 
Republican 2.61 (.24) .000 2.60 (.24) .000 2.56 (.22) .000 2.79 (.35) .000 
Democrat -2.50 (.24) .000 -2.55 (.24) .000 -2.69 (.24) .000 -2.39 (.36) .000 
Age -.001 (.005) .793 -.002 (.005) .734 -.001 (.007) .985 -.003 (.009) .684 
Male .25 (.19) .195 .25 (.19) .189 .24 (.20) .236 .48 (.28) .093 
White .74 (.31) .016 .76 (.32) .018 .93 (.34) .006 .66 (.38) .082 
Education -.10 (.06) .087 -.10 (.06) .091 -.09 (.06) .165 -.19 (.17) .266 
Income .12 (.05) .023 .12 (.06) .061 .14 (.06) .031 .12 (.07) .092 
Protestant .31 (.19) .096 .31 (.19) .107 
Born again/ Evangelical/ .97 (.20) .000 .84 (.33) .010 
Fundamentalist Christian 
Percent Vote for Bush in 5.41 (1.09) .000 5.00 (2.10) .017 
2000 in Respondent's State 
Constant -1.33 (.55) .015 -1.28 (.53) .017 -4.34 (.93) .000 -3.54 (1.38) .010 
Pseudo R2 .52 .53 .55 .53 
Wald Chi2 499.75 .000 605.13 .000 599.44 .000 160.17 .000 
Number 951 951 963 551 
Note: The dependent variable ispresidential vote choice in 2004. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted by clustering cases by state. Statistical significance (p values) are reported tothe right of 
the coefficients arebased on two-tailed tests. 
marriage as an important issue. That we find this 
relationship toward the end of the campaign, but not 
early in the campaign, suggests strongly that the 
marriage measures were the mechanism that primed 
some voters to assess candidates in terms of the gay 
marriage issue. The marriage issue had a stronger 
effect on support for Bush in states where marriage 
measures were on the ballot. Some critical questions 
flow from our results that we must consider, but that 
we cannot answer definitively here. First, what type of 
issues, under what conditions, have the capacity to be 
used in conjunction with direct democracy to prime 
voters in the manner identified in this study? Second, 
does what we observe here represent a dangerous 
form of manipulative campaigning? 
As far as the first question, gay marriage was a 
relatively low salience issue in 2004, with most people 
opposed to legal same-sex marriage (as opposed to 
civil unions). The two major candidates had oppos- 
ing positions on the need for constitutional mend- 
ments prohibiting same-sex marriage. It would seem 
that some amount of issue valence, combined with 
candidates having distinct positions on the issue, 
would be necessary conditions for direct democracy 
to be used to prime an issue such that it works to the 
advantage of one candidate. These conditions may 
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TABLE 4 Testing the Counterfactual: Bush Support Estimated with Residence in Marriage State, 
Interacted with Other Issues Respondents Ranked as Very Important. (October National 
Sample) 
Dependent Variable = Intend to Vote Bush 
Resides in Marriage Ban State .17 (.31) .52 -.57 (.40) .14 .07 (.46) .87 -.44 (.38) .24 
Ban State * Moral Values Very Important -.41 (.29) .15 
Ban State * Iraq Very Important .56 (.46) .22 
Ban State * Economy Very Important -.29 (.58) .62 
Ban State * Terrorism Very Important .36 (.50) .47 
Moral Values Very Important .96 (.24) .00 
Gay Marriage Very Important .22 (.23) .34 .22 (.23) .34 .23 (.23) .32 
Iraq Very Important -.78 (.23) .00 -.82 (.29) .00 -.66 (.25) .00 -.66 (.24) .00 
Economy Very Important -1.42 (.29) .00 -1.29 (.27) .00 -1.21 (.32) .00 -1.27 (.27) .00 
Terrorism Very Important 2.00 (.27) .00 2.15 (.29) .00 2.10 (.28) .00 2.02 (.31) .00 
Republican 2.40 (.23) .00 2.57 (.23) .00 2.57 (.23) .00 2.58 (.23) .00 
Democrat -2.66 (.25) .00 -2.61 (.24) .00 -2.64 (.24) .00 -2.63 (.24) .00 
Age -.002 (.006) .69 .001 (.006) .89 .001 (.006) .89 .001 (.006) .90 
Male .27 (.18) .13 .23 (.20) .24 .23 (.20) .24 .23 (.20) .24 
White .97 (.33) .00 .89 (.32) .00 .90 (.33) .00 .88 (.33) .00 
Education -.003(.07) .96 -.08 (.06) .17 -.09 (.06) .15 -.09 (.06) .16 
Income .13 (.06) .04 .13 (.07) .04 .14 (.07) .03 .14 (.07) .03 
Born Again Christian .97 (.21) .00 .94 (.20) .00 .94 (.20) .00 .94 (.20) .00 
Bush Pct Vote 2000 in state 5.76 (1.14) .00 5.30 (1.06) .00 5.37 (1.08) .00 5.31 (1.05) .00 
Constant -5.04 (.97) .00 -4.22 (.98) .00 -4.40 (.99) .00 -4.27 (.94) .00 
Pseudo R2 .55 .54 .54 .54 
Wald Chi2 522.63 .00 588.83 .00 564.41 .00 566.27 .00 
Number 978 963 963 963 
Note: The dependent variable ispresidential vote intention / reported vote in 2004. Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted by clustering cases by state. Statistical significance (p values) reported to
the right of coefficients ba ed on two-tailed tests. 
not be too rare: presidential campaigns have proven 
to be adept at identifying (or crafting) such issues 
(e.g., race, immigration, criminal justice). There are 
at least two more conditions that may be necessary: 
(1) the issue must reach state ballots, and (2) it must 
coincide with a presidential contest. This is possible 
in any of the fifty states where advocates of an issue 
(or a candidate) have the political strength required 
to qualify a legislative r ferendum (or citizen initiative). 
The second question is more perplexing. As 
Bartels (2003) notes, framing and priming effects in 
politics are often taken as evidence that elites manip- 
ulate the judgment of citizens, of the limits to citizen 
competence, and the general weakness of liberal 
models of democracy. The fact that direct democracy 
has the capacity to prime voters to assign greater 
emphasis to a specific issue when voting for president 
raises important normative issues. It suggests that, in 
addition to traditional mechanisms campaigns use to 
increase attention to an issue (e.g., campaign rhet- 
oric, paid advertising), campaigns may have another 
tool to alter the set of potentially relevant consid- 
erations used by voters in specific states. 
What of the normative implications of this? This 
may be seen as elite manipulation of voters and 
evidence of the ills of modern direct democracy. Or 
ballot measures may simply be another of many tools 
available to elites who compete to shape the public 
agenda. Our findings are consistent with research 
demonstrating limits to framing and priming effects 
and suggest hat a limited pool of voters-those less 
attentive to a presidential campaign-are likely to be 
affected by priming via direct democracy. Large 
majorities of voters in our samples did report high 
levels of interest, and most reported having a partisan 
identification that predisposes them to vote for one 
of the major party candidates. This suggest hat there 
limits to how much elites can use direct democracy to 
prime-or manipulate-voters. Yet in a very close 
election, a small proportion of marginal voters being 
affected by a direct democracy prime could be a 
nontrivial matter. 
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TABLE 5 Predicted Probability of Supporting Bush Nationwide, 2004 
Respondent lives in Respondent lives in 
All Respondents state with no marriage state with marriage 
(Estimated from measure on ballot measure on ballot 
Table 3, Column 1) (Estimated from Table 3, Column2) 
R said gay marriage is .48 (.05) .49 (.06) .44 (.06) 
not very important when 
evaluating presidential 
candidates 
R said gay marriage .57 (.06) .53 (.07) .69 (.08) 
is very important when 
evaluating presidential 
candidates 
Note: Predicted probabilities estimated with Clarify. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. We hold age, income and education at 
their means. Gender is set at female, race/ethnicity at white (non-Hispanic) and religion at Protestant. All simulations e timated for 
independents. Believing terrorism, Iraq and economy "very important" inpresidential vote set at modal categories (yes). 
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